Institute of Philosophy
Russian Academy of Sciences

  Artem Iunusov
Home Page » » Department of the History of Western Philosophy » Staff » Artem Iunusov

Artem Iunusov


Artem Iunusov,  Junior Research Fellow at the Department of Western Philosophy


Year and Place of Birth


Born June 16, 1991 in Ekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk), Russian Federation





  • Graduated from Lomonosov Moscow State University, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of History and Theory of World Culture, in 2013
  • Doctorate Study at the Lomonosov Moscow State University, Faculty of Philosophy, 2013–2016.



Academic Degrees

  • Candidate of Sciences (PhD equivalent degree), 2017. Doctorate Thesis: «Structure of demonstrative science in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics» (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Faculty of Philosophy)

Research interests

  • Ancient Philosophy;
  • Modern Analytic Philosophy; 
  • Junior Research Fellow at the Department of Western Philosophy, RAS Institute of Philosophy (Moscow)
  • Assistant Lecturer at Department of History and Philosophy of Institute of Institute of Basic Education in Moscow State University of Civil Engineering – National Research University.
Research projects
  • RSUH, project No 15-03-00864а, The fourth book of the Metaphysics of Aristotle (Gamma): its origins, content and interpretation in Greek and Latin philosophical traditions






  • Artem Yunusov. “On Possible Interpolation of Certain Mathematical Examples in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics”, ‒ Voprosy filosofii. 2019. No 10. Pages 165‒177. ‒ (In Russian) ‒ DOI: 10.31857/S004287440006055‒5

In the following article I cautiously propose a hypothesis aimed towards resolving several problems of the text of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. The hypothesis is that some of the examples that are used in Posterior Analytics to illustrate its doctrine of the first principles of demonstrative knowledge (most importantly – the example of unit), are in fact interpolations of a later editor of the text. My argument is the following one. We know, that in case of Aristotle’ texts some kind of editorial work by one or several later editors is most probable. In case of Posterior Analytics it is more probable, than in case of other texts – if only for the fact of its exceptional convolution and proneness to contradict itself. Examples are exactly where we are to anticipate editorial work to be found. The examples, with which the doctrine of the first principles are illustrated contradict each other more often than not. In case of the most frequent of those example – the example of the unit – there is at least one place (93b24-25) of which we can be fairly sure that it was interpolated (as it both does not illustrate the thesis it is supposed to illustrate and breaks the continuity of the text). This gives us additional grounds to suspect other instances of the same example. We can also suggest from where the example of the unit was drawn by a hypothetical editor and why was it used by him so stubbornly. The proposed suggestions would help to explain several of the major contradictions extant in the text of Posterior Analytics as we have it. 


  • "The “Surprisingly Consistent” Posterior Analytics. A review of: David Bronstein. Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior Analytics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. ΧΙΙΙ, 272 pp.", ‒ ΣΧΟΛΗ. Filosofskoe antikovedenie i klassicheskaya traditsiya. 2018. No. 1. Pages 99–108. (In Russian) DOI: 10.21267/AQUILO.2018.12.1041

The present article is a review of the recent comprehensive study of the doctrines of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. I outline the ideas used by D. Bronstein in his interpretation of the Posterior Analytics, inspecting, at the same time, soundness of some of these ideas. Among other points, I show that Bronstein's conception of two models of demonstration is not really supported by the text of the Posterior Analytics and that the set of "ingredients" of demonstrative science offered by him cannot be correct, since it is at odds with examples of the arrangement of demonstrations offered by Aristotle himself.


  • "Definitions of Posterior Analytics’ Demonstrations: Major or Minor Terms?", ‒ Voprosy filosofii. 2017. №8. Pages 166‒179. (In Russian)
The article researches the question of whether the definitions, used in demonstrative syllogisms of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics as premises, are the definitions of major or minor terms of the syllogism. First I show that in all cases, contrary to the traditional understanding of this problem, it is the definition of major term that concerns Aristotle: all the relevant textual evidence speak in favor of that interpretation while there is no explicit evidence against it. Then, I reveal the fallacies upon which the widely held assumption that demonstration uses definitions of the minor term is based. One of those fallacies is an attempt to conceive the process of demonstration, described in Posterior Analytics, as analogous to (and perhaps based on) the process of Platonic diaeresis, which leads commentators to focus on examples of demonstration, that are inadequate to the point and at best accessory for Aristotle himself. The other main mistake is an implicit assumption that the process of demonstration of essential attribute has to reflect directly one of the types of essential connection between a subject of demonstration and an essential attribute that is being demonstrated of it, described in Posterior Analytics I.4. I show that the rejection of these two fallacious interpretational moves is not only justified, but also gives us an overall more coherent picture of the doctrine of Posterior Analytics.
  • Principle of Contradiction as an Axiom: Regarding the Origin and the Status of the "Common Principles" in Aristotle’s Philosophy // Voprosy filosofii. 2017. №1. Pages 122‒132. (In Russian)

The topic of the present paper is the principle of contradiction and its initial status in Aristotle’s philosophy, where it functions as one of the “common principles” of all sciences. In course of the paper I try to answer the question of how exactly those common principles are supposed to function within the model of demonstrative science of Aristotle. After analyzing the doctrines of Posterior Analytics and Metaphysic I come to conclusion, that there is a contradiction in the theory that describes functioning of the common principles. This contradiction, I believe, cannot be resolved within the doctrine of Aristotle’s demonstrative science, but its’ origins can be explained historically, if we accept the hypothesis of the certain way in which the “first principles” of Aristotle’s philosophy originate from the axiomatic principles of the Ancient Greek mathematics.
  • Essentialism and Semantic Theory of Aristotle in Modern Analytic Philosophy // Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Politics [Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta]. 2016. Issue 4(36). Pages 112‒119. (In Russian)
A certain tendency can be spotted in the English-speaking philosophical community predominantly (but not exclusively) among ancient philosophy scholars in the last few decades. It is a tendency to compare certain traits of Aristotle's philosophy with the semantic theories of certain modern analytics philosophers mainly with those ones of Sual Kripke and Hillary Putnam. The subjects under comparison are "essentialism" and certain elements of "semantic theory" of Aristotle and the semantic theories of Putnam and Kripke. Comparing those scholars find surprisingly large number of similar traits starting with the thesis, that essences of the certain objects, though being necessary, are discovered in course of scientific investigation and in certain cases all the way to the "linguistic division of labor". But how valuable such comparisons really are? To answer that we have to turn to the question of for what purposes comparison of two theories can be performed at all. We can compare two theories to track a historical influence of the earlier to the later but that is obviously not the case with the theories under question, as they are not connected in any such way. We can further use the earlier theory that is more familiar and more clear to as a means of understanding a later and a less intelligible; but that in not the case as well in our case, as the theory in question of Aristotle, being fragmentary, not easy to follow and overall convoluted, is much less intelligible than those of Kripke and Putnam. Finally we can on contrary try to elucidate the earlier convoluted theory by the comparing it to the later and intelligible one; however if there is no real historical connection between them (and in our case there is not) we have no right to do that, as we would be forcing the problematic of the later theory on the earlier one with no ground for doing that whatsoever. Therefore I come to the conclusion that this kind of comparisons can not be counted among theoretically valuable ones: it can be curious and quite entertaining, but it can hardly help us to understand either of the theories in question.
The present paper endeavors to compare the general theory of scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) as described in Posterior Analytics with the specific theory of science or 'first philosophy' expounded in the fourth book of Metaphysics. Both theories are examined not on the ground of any general preconceived hypothesis regarding their relation to one another, but by closely investigating the local characteristics peculiar to either of them. The set of characteristics brought under comparison comprises any special properties both the subject and the attributes under investigation possess, the way they are related to the first principles of science, as well as the general question of whether the science in question is supposed to be demonstrative. As a result, it can be shown that, contrary to the opinion dominating the present-day Aristotelian studies, the project of the first philosophy as it is described in Metaphysics IV presupposes the construction of a type of knowledge which, while remaining essentially different from the 'particular' sciences of the Posterior Analytics, is still a demonstrative science and has its main goal in giving an account of the demonstrable properties of any existent items in terms of their most general attributes by means of common definitions.

Participation at conferences

  • «Two Epistemological Perspectives in David Chalmers' Project of Conceptual Analysis» // International Interdisciplinary Conference uAnalytiCon-2018: Mind and the Limits of Language. Yekaterinburg, May 10-12, 2018.
Researcher ID
  • Web of Science Researcher ID:  J-4442-2018
  • Scopus Author ID:  57196039176
  • e-mail: